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I study the eects of risk and ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) on optimal
portfolios and equilibrium asset prices when investors receive information that
is dicult to link to fundamentals. I show that the desire of investors to hedge
ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia and excess volatility. Specically, when
news is surprising, then investors may not react to price changes although
there are no transaction costs or other market frictions. Moreover, I show that
small shocks to cash ow news, asset betas, or market risk premia may lead to
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This paper studies the eects of aversion to risk and ambiguity on optimal portfolios
and equilibrium asset prices when investors receive public information about the value
of an asset. Investors lack data or experience to process this new information and
thus do not know the asset distribution when they condition on this information. I
show that the desire of investors to hedge against ambiguity (i) leads to portfolio
inertia for risky portfolios and (ii) generates excess volatility for asset prices.
Investors face risk and ambiguity when they evaluate an investment in an asset
because they neither know the future realization of the asset's payo (risk), nor the
probability of it occurring (ambiguity). This distinction between risk and ambiguity is
often attributed to Knight (1921). In this paper, investor's preferences are represented
by \max-min" expected utility. In other words, investors evaluate the outcome of an
investment with respect to a set of models and then choose the model that leads
to the lowest expected utility. These preferences exhibit aversion to ambiguity and
are axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Moreover, the axioms describe
behavior that is consistent with experimental evidence (Ellsberg (1961)) and more
recent portfolio choice experiments (Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2010) and Bossaerts,
Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010)).
By focusing on the interaction between risk and ambiguity when investors process
a public signal with unknown precision, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First
this paper provides novel predictions for optimal portfolios that may help explain
why many investors who own stocks do not show much trading activity. For instance,
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) document that almost half of the sample members made no
active changes to their portfolio allocation using data from the Surveys of Consumer
Finances and from TIAA-CREF.
I show that when news is disappointing, then investors can nd risky stock
allocations that hedge against ambiguous news and thus it is optimal to stick to
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these allocations even if prices change. Hence, investors exhibit portfolio inertia for
risky portfolios without any market frictions such as transaction costs and liquidity
needs (Allen and Gale (1994) and Williamson (1994)), entry cost (Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), Paiella (2007), and Yaron and Zhang (2000)), or inattention (Abel, Eberly,
and Panageas (2007)). Moreover, portfolio inertia occurs more often when investors
use the stock to also hedge the risk of other assets and it is more severe when news
is very surprising.1
Second, this paper produces new insights into the excess volatility puzzle of stock
returns (Shiller (1992)). Specically, I nd that small shocks to cash ow news may re-
sult in drastic changes in the interpretation of this news and hence an econometrician
observing the resulting large stock price movements may conclude excess volatility.2
The amplication of these news shocks is more severe for risky stocks. Similarly, I
show that when past evidence about the cash ows of an asset are very disappointing,
then small shocks to the beta of the asset with the market portfolio and/or the market
risk premium may result in drastic changes in the stock price. Hence, the interac-
tion of risk and ambiguity may help explain that stock price volatility spikes around
earnings announcements (Dubinsky and Johannes (2005)) or shortly after very bad
news such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the assassination of JFK, the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, or major defaults such as LTCM, Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers
(Bloom (2009)).
This paper is most closely related to Epstein and Schneider (2008), who investi-
gate the impact of ambiguous information on stock prices assuming a representative
investor who is risk neutral and averse to ambiguous information. I build on their
work along two dimensions: (i) investors are risk averse3 and (ii) investors receive
stochastic labor income. I show that the interaction of risk and ambiguity leads to
portfolio inertia for risky portfolios when investors process ambiguous news. More-
over, I show that risk aversion has qualitatively very dierent implications for stock
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prices. Specically, the stock price has a discontinuity which it does not have when
investors are risk neutral and thus the eects of ambiguity aversion on stock prices
can be distinguished from the eects of risk alone.4
It is well known that ambiguity aversion leads to portfolio inertia for the risk-
free portfolio and thus helps explain non-market participation (Dow and Werlang
(1992), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), and Epstein and Schneider (2007)). Epstein
and Schneider (2010) show that portfolio inertia can also arise for risky portfolios
when investors use an ambiguous asset to hedge a risky bond position. Epstein and
Wang (1994) emphasize that portfolio inertia can arise for long stock positions and
thus there may exist a continuum of equilibrium stock prices. I show in this paper
that the interaction of risk and ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia for risky portfolios
when investors process ambiguous news which leads to an interval of equilibrium stock
prices for some fundamentals.
This paper is also related to recent papers by Easley and O'Hara: Easley and
O'Hara (2010) show that ambiguity aversion can explain sudden market freezes. In
this paper investors are averse to ambiguity in the sense of Bewley (2002) and thus
portfolio inertia arises as part of the preference specication. Easley and O'Hara
(2009) study the implications of regulation and ambiguity on equilibrium asset prices
when some investors are ambiguous about the mean and variance of an asset in
the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and some are standard expected utility
maximizers. They nd that portfolio inertia arises only at the risk-free portfolio and
thus ambiguity aversion only indirectly aects equilibrium asset prices. I show in this
paper that ambiguity averse investors participate in the stock market but nevertheless
exhibit portfolio inertia and thus their behavior directly aects equilibrium asset
prices.
Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) introduce \smooth" preferences to de-
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scribe ambiguity averse behavior. For instance, Caskey (2009) studies how the aggre-
gation of information aects equity prices when some investors are standard expected
utility maximizers and some have smooth ambiguity aversion preferences. I focus on
kinked preferences instead of smooth preferences because Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv
(2010) and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) nd that individu-
als behavior is more easily described with kinked than with smooth preferences. They
also document that there is substantial heterogeneity in risk and ambiguity aversion
and a non-negligible fraction of individuals behavior is consistent with standard ex-
pected utility. Hence, I also study the eects of heterogeneity among investors on
equilibrium stock prices and show that the excess volatility result is robust to aggre-
gation.
This paper is also related to the literature on learning about fundamentals to
explain the excess volatility puzzle. Brennan and Xia (2001) and Veronesi (2000)
consider an economy in which investors learn about the unobservable expected divi-
dend growth rate. In these papers investors have standard expected utility preferences
and thus consider a single posterior distribution to determine expected utility. I also
study the eects of learning about signal quality on optimal portfolios and equilibrium
asset prices when investors are standard expected utility maximizers. I show that as-
set demand is a strictly decreasing and smooth function of the stock price and thus
there is no portfolio inertia. Moreover, the equilibrium stock price is a continuous
and smooth function of the signal and thus there is no excess volatility.
Routledge and Zin (2009) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) study the
connection of ambiguity with liquidity. Routledge and Zin (2009) consider a nancial
intermediary who makes a market in a derivative security and show that ambiguity
can drastically increase the bid-ask spread and hence reduce liquidity. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2008) study the eects of ambiguity about the impact of aggregate
liquidity shocks on investors and show that this ambiguity can lead to a socially
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inecient ight to quality. In this paper, the interaction of risk and ambiguity leads
to portfolio inertia and excess volatility.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section I, I introduce the model. In Section
II, I solve for optimal asset demand and discuss the portfolio inertia results. In Section
III, I solve for equilibrium stock prices. In Section IV, I discuss the robustness of the
results to aggregation. In Section V, I study the eects of Bayesian learning on
optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset prices and I conclude in Section VI.
I Model
Suppose there are two dates 0 and 1. Investors can invest in a risk-free asset and a
risky asset. Let p denote the price of the risky asset, ~d the future value or dividend of
the risky asset,  the number of shares invested in the risky asset, and ~L the random
endowment that investors receive at date 1. There is no consumption at date zero.
The risk-free asset is used as numeraire, so the risk-free rate is zero. Hence, future
wealth ~w is given by
~w = w0 +

~d  p

 + ~L; (1)
in which w0 denotes initial wealth.
Investors receive a signal ~s about the future value of the asset ~d. The signal
~s is conditionally independent of labor income ~L. A model consists of a marginal
distribution of ~d and ~L and a conditional distribution of ~s given ~d. Investors neither
know the marginal distribution nor the conditional distribution.
I focus in this paper on ambiguity averse investors in the sense of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). Specically, let u() denote the Bernoulli utility function of the
investor, m a model,M(s) the set of all models considered by the investor, and Em[]
the expectation with respect to the belief generated by the model m. An ambiguity
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averse investor in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) chooses a portfolio  to
maximize
inf
m2M(s)
Em [u ( ~w) j ~s = s] (2)
subject to the budget constraint given in equation (1).
The curvature of the utility function u() determines an investor's risk aversion
whereas the size ofM(s) determines an investors aversion to ambiguity. Investors who
are averse to ambiguity behave as if they have a set of models (a set of marginals and
a set of conditionals) in mind when evaluating the outcome of a decision. The worst
case scenario (the belief generated by m that leads to the lowest expected utility)
that they consider may depend on the portfolio position  and/or the realization of
the signal s.
Suppose that both the marginal distribution of ~d and ~L and the conditional distri-
bution of ~s given ~d is normal. There is no ambiguity about the marginal distribution
of ~d and ~L and thus there is a single normal marginal:5
0B@ ~d
~L
1CA  N
0B@
0B@ d
L
1CA ;
0B@ 2d dL
dL 
2
L
1CA
1CA : (3)
Investors are ambiguous about the conditional distribution of ~s given ~d and thus there
is a family of conditionals:
~s = ~d+ ~"; ~"  N  0; 2 ; (4)
in which 2 2 [2a; 2b ]  [0;1]. Investors are ambiguous about the precision of the
signal and thus consider a set of precisions when processing this signal. The signal is
conditionally independent of labor income and thus Cov
h
~"; ~L
i
= 0.
I follow Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) and assume that investors update their
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beliefs model by model using Bayes rule. Hence, observing the signal does not lead
to a reduction in ambiguity and M(s) = M.6 Specically, each model m 2 M
determines a conditional belief for ~d and ~L given ~s and hence standard normal-normal
updating for each 2 2 [2a; 2b ] leads to0B@ ~d
~L
1CA j ~s = s  N
0B@
0B@ d+   s  d
L+ z
 
s  d
1CA ;
0B@ 2d(1  ) dL(1  )
dL(1  ) 2L
 
1  2
1CA
1CA ; (5)
in which z = L
d
and  = 2d=(
2
d + 
2). If labor income is correlated with the
asset (z 6= 0), then investors use the signal to learn about future labor income which
generates ambiguity about the distribution of future labor income.
It is convenient to describe the informativeness of the signal by  and hence the
set of posterior beliefs is given by [a; b]  [0; 1] with
a = 
2
d=(
2
d + 
2
b ) (6)
b = 
2
d=(
2
d + 
2
a): (7)
The utility of an investor who is averse to ambiguous information holds  shares of
the risky asset and receives the random endowment ~L is therefore7
min
2[a;b]
E
h
u

w0 +

~d  p

 + ~L

j ~s = s
i
: (8)
Investors are more averse to ambiguous information if the interval [a; b] is large
and therefore the degree of aversion to ambiguous information can be measured by
b   a.
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II Optimal Demand
In this section I determine the optimal portfolio of an investor who can invest in
a risky asset and a risk-free asset and who receives stochastic labor income and an
ambiguous signal about the future value of the risky asset. I show that there is
a range of prices for which investors do not change their stock position and hence
exhibit portfolio inertia.
Suppose investors have CARA utility over future wealth ~w (i.e. u( ~w) =  e  ~w
with  > 0) and let CE() denote the certainty equivalent of an ambiguity averse
investor. Then the investor's utility given in equation (8) is equal to u (CE()) with8
CE() = min
2[a;b]

E [ ~w j ~s = s]  1
2
Var [ ~w j ~s = s]

: (9)
The assumption of CARA-utility and normal beliefs leads to mean-variance prefer-
ences over future wealth (nancial wealth plus labor income) in which the informa-
tiveness of the signal measured by  aects both the mean and the variance. The
worst case scenarios for the mean and the variance can not be chosen independently
of each other and hence the belief of an ambiguity averse investor will depend on the
realization of the signal s, the portfolio position , and the beta of labor income with
the asset z as the next proposition shows.9
Proposition 1 (Preferences). Let ^  2( d  s)=(2d). Then,
CE() =
8>>>><>>>>:
Ea [ ~w j ~s = s]  12Vara [ ~w j ~s = s] if  + z  min

^; 0

Eb [ ~w j ~s = s]  12Varb [ ~w j ~s = s] if min

^; 0

<  + z < max

^; 0

Ea [ ~w j ~s = s]  12Vara [ ~w j ~s = s] if  + z  max

^; 0

:
(10)
The certainty equivalent CE() is a continuous and concave function of the stock
demand . Moreover, it is continuously dierentiable except for the portfolios  =  z
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and  = ^   z if s 6= d.
To gain some more intuition consider an investor who is contemplating a long
position in the asset ( > 0). The worst case scenario for the posterior asset mean is
a reliable signal (high ) if bad news arrives and an unreliable signal (low ) if good
news arrives because the mean is signicantly adjusted downwards with bad news
and moderately adjusted upwards with good news.
Similarly, the worst case scenario for the posterior asset mean when an investor
is contemplating a short position in the asset ( < 0) is an unreliable signal when
bad news arrives and a reliable signal when good news arrives. On the other hand,
the worst case scenario for the residual asset variance is always an unreliable signal
because in this case less risk is resolved by the signal.
Suppose there is no correlation between the asset and labor income (z = 0) and
hence there is no ambiguity about future labor income. If the signal conveys bad
news, then a reliable signal decreases the posterior asset mean (since more weight is
put on the signal) but it also reduces the residual variance (since more risk is resolved
by the signal). Investors are more worried about the posterior mean for small risks
and are more worried about the residual variance for big risks. Hence, the signal is
treated as reliable ( = b) for moderate long positions in the asset (0 <  < ^) and
as unreliable ( = a) otherwise.
There is a portfolio with an intermediate level of risk ( = ^) for which the coun-
teracting mean and variance eects oset each other and utility becomes independent
of signal precision. This portfolio is more risky if there is a big news surprise because
in this case there is more ambiguity about the mean. It is less risky when investors are
more risk averse because in this case investors are more worried about the ambiguous
variance. The second portfolio for which utility does not depend on signal precision
is the riskless portfolio  = 0.
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Suppose labor income is correlated with the asset (z 6= 0) and thus there is
also ambiguity about future labor income. Then the portfolios for which utility is
independent of the precision of the signal are shifted by the hedging demand for labor
income z and therefore are  =  z and  = ^   z.
To summarize, an investor who has CARA utility and is averse to ambiguous
information in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) will evaluate the outcome
of a portfolio with respect to the belief  that leads to the lowest expected utility.
Hence, utility of an ambiguity averse investor has two kinks if the signal doesn't
conrm the unconditional mean of the dividend and are otherwise smooth.10 The
optimal demand for the risky asset when investors are averse to risk and ambiguous
information is determined below.
A Savage Benchmark
The demand of a standard expected utility maximizer in the sense of Savage (1954)
with subjective belief  is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Demand|Savage Benchmark). Let a = b = . Then the
demand function for the risky asset is
(p) =
E
h
~d j ~s = s
i
  p
Var
h
~d j ~s = s
i   z: (11)
Investors use the signal to learn about the future value of the asset. Suppose there
is no correlation between the endowment and the asset; i.e. z = 0. Then investors
will buy the asset as long as the posterior mean exceeds the asset price and they will
sell otherwise. Moreover, investors will buy/sell larger quantities if the signal is more
precise. If investors receive an endowment that is correlated with the asset (z 6= 0),
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then they will use the asset to hedge their labor income risk. For instance, investors
will sell some of the asset if their future labor income is positively correlated with the
asset (z > 0) and buy otherwise (z < 0).
B Ambiguity Averse Investors
Let a(p) denote the demand of a Savage investor with subjective belief a (a standard
expected utility maximizer who treats the signal as unreliable) and b(p) the demand
of a Savage investor with subjective belief b (a standard expected utility maximizer
who treats the signal as reliable). The solution to the portfolio choice problem of an
investor who has CARA utility and is averse to ambiguity is provided in the next
theorem.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Demand). The optimal demand function (p) for an investor
with risk aversion  and aversion to ambiguous information described by [a; b] is
continuously decreasing in p if s = d and continuously non-increasing in p if s 6= d.
Specically, let ^ = 2( d  s)=(2d) then
(p) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
a(p) p  p1  a(s) max

^; 0

va
max

^; 0

  z p1 < p  p2  b(s) max

^; 0

vb
b(p) p2 < p  p3  b(s) min

^; 0

vb
min

^; 0

  z p3 < p  p4  a(s) min

^; 0

va
a(p) p > p4;
(12)
in which (s) = d + (s   d) denotes the posterior asset mean and v = 2d(1   )
denotes the residual asset variance when the signal precision is .
Suppose the asset is uncorrelated with labor income (z = 0). Optimal demand
when the signal conveys bad news (s < d) is presented in the left graph of Figure 1. If
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ambiguity averse investors (solid line) take on large long positions in the asset, then
they are more worried about risk than a low posterior mean and hence they treat
the signal as uninformative. In this case their demand coincides with the demand of
a Savage investor with belief a (dashed line). However, if they take on a moderate
long position when the signal conveys bad news, then they are more worried about
a low posterior mean than risk and hence they treat the signal as informative. In
this case their demand coincides with the demand of a Savage investor with belief b
(chain-dotted line).11 There are two portfolios  = 0 and  = ^ for which the demand
of an ambiguity averse investor is insensitive to changes in the asset price and thus
it is distinctly dierent from the demand of a Savage investor.
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***
C Portfolio Inertia
It is well known in the literature that with max-min preferences portfolio inertia arises
at certainty (Dow and Werlang (1992), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), and Epstein
and Schneider (2007)). For instance, if investors think about taking on a small long
(short) position in the asset, then they fear reliable signals that convey bad (good)
news and unreliable signals that convey good (bad) news because this means a low
posterior mean for their stock position and hence there is a range of prices for which
they rather not be invested in the stock to avoid ambiguity.
Ambiguous information leads to inertia away from certainty because a reliable
signal that conveys bad news decreases the posterior mean but also reduces the resid-
ual variance. The counteracting eect of mean and variance on utility exactly oset
each other and utility becomes independent of signal precision if investors long the
portfolio  = ^. This portfolio hedges against ambiguity and small price changes
cannot entice investors away from it because taking on slightly more or less risk than
13
that of the hedging portfolios leads to a large change in the worst case scenario belief
about the informativeness of the signal.12
The right graph of Figure 1 shows optimal demand when the signal conveys bad
news (s < d) and asset and labor income are positively correlated (z > 0). In this case
the hedging demand for labor income risk is negative and demand shifts downwards.
Neither the posterior mean nor the residual variance of future wealth (nancial wealth
and labor income) depend on the signal precision for the portfolios  =  z and
 = ^   z and thus investors exhibit portfolio inertia for two risky portfolios. The
portfolios that hedge against ambiguity are less invested in the stock because investors
need to sell some of the stock to reduce the additional ambiguity about future wealth
due to the positive correlation between the asset and labor income.
The size of the inaction region depends on the degree of ambiguity and on the
news surprise as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3 (Portfolio Inertia). The size of the price region at which investors
exhibit portfolio inertia is
(b   a) js  dj: (13)
There is more ambiguity about the posterior mean when news is very surprising
and thus larger price changes are necessary to convince an ambiguity averse investor
to give up either of the two hedging portfolios  =  z and  = ^   z. On the other
hand, if the signal conrms the unconditional mean of the dividend, then there is no
ambiguity about the conditional mean and hence there is no portfolio inertia because
the ambiguity averse investor treats the signal as unreliable for all portfolios and
hedging demands for labor income.
The left graph of Figure 1 shows optimal demand when the signal conveys bad
news and the right graph shows optimal demand when the signal conveys good news.
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A very large news surprise leads to a large inaction region (dashed line). Moreover,
the portfolio position at which investors exhibit inertia is riskier when news is very
surprising because the resulting increase in ambiguity about the residual variance is
oset by the increase in ambiguity about the posterior mean when news is worse than
expected.
*** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***
I conclude this section with a summary of the predictions for optimal portfolios.
Corollary 1. If investors are averse to risk and ambiguity, then
(i) there is a range of prices for which investors are neither long/nor short the stock
when news is surprising,
(ii) there is a range of prices for which investors do not adjust their long stock
position when news is worse than expected,
(iii) there is a range of prices for which investors do not adjust their short stock
position when news is better than expected,
(iv) the need of investors to hedge labor income risk leads to portfolio inertia for
risky portfolios when news is surprising, and
(v) portfolio inertia is more severe for extreme news surprises.
III Equilibrium
In this section I solve for equilibrium prices when a representative investor receives
ambiguous information about an asset. I show that small shocks to news about cash
ows, asset betas, or market risk premia may lead to drastic changes in asset prices.
The proof of the existence of a representative investor is deferred to Section IV.
15
Suppose there is a representative investor with CARA-utility who is averse to
ambiguity. In equilibrium, the representative investor holds the stock and consumes
the liquidating dividend ~d and the labor income ~L. Hence, the stock price at date
one equals the liquidating dividend and  = 1. The stock price at date zero which is
denoted by p(s) is determined below.
A Savage Benchmark
Suppose the representative investor is a standard expected utility maximizer with
subjective belief  and let p(s) denote the stock price in this case. The equilibrium
stock price is provided in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Price|Savage Benchmark). Let a = b = . Then
p(s) = E
h
~d j ~s = s
i
  (1 + z)Var
h
~d j ~s = s
i
: (14)
The stock price is lower when labor income is positively correlated with the ag-
gregate dividend because in this case the representative investor would like to sell the
stock to hedge labor income risk and thus the price has to decrease to keep him from
doing that. Similarly, better news increases the posterior mean of the stock and thus
the price has to increase to clear the market.
The stock price satises the Capital Asset Pricing Model:
p(s) = E
h
~d j ~s = s
i
   Cov
h
~w; ~d j ~s = s
i
= d+ (s  d)  (1  );
(15)
in which  denotes the unconditional beta of the stock with the market portfolio and
16
 denotes the unconditional risk premium of the market portfolio.13 Specically,
 =
Cov
h
~w; ~d
i
Var [ ~w]
=
(1 + z)2d
2d + 2dL + 
2
L
(16)
 = Var [ ~w] = 
 
2d + 2dL + 
2
L

: (17)
The stock price p(s) is a strictly increasing continuous function of the signal s and a
strictly decreasing and continuous function of the unconditional stock risk premium
. This is no longer true when investors are averse to ambiguity as the remainder
of this section shows.
B Aversion to Ambiguity
Let pa(s) and pb(s) denote the equilibrium stock price when the representative in-
vestor is a standard expected utility maximizers with subjective belief a and b,
respectively. The equilibrium stock price when the representative investor is averse
to ambiguity is given in the next theorem.14
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium Stock Price). Let s^ = d  1
2
. There is a unique equilib-
rium stock price correspondence:
p(s) 2
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
fpa(s)g if s > s^ and  > 0 or s < s^ and  < 0
Ps^ if s = s^ and  > 0 or  < 0
fpb(s)g if s < s^ and  > 0 or s > s^ and  < 0
P0(s) if  = 0:
(18)
Specically, p 2 Ps^, if 9  2 [a; b] such that p = d + (s^   d)   (1   ) and
p 2 P0(s), if 9  2 [a; b] such that p = d+ (s  d).
The left graph of Figure 3 shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when there
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is no ambiguity about future labor income (z = 0 and thus  = 2d). The represen-
tative investor is more worried about a low posterior mean when the signal is lower
than s^ and more worried about risk when the signal exceeds s^ because the posterior
mean goes down when the signal decreases, whereas the residual variance does not
depend on the signal. Hence, there is a strong price reaction to very bad news be-
cause the representative investor treats all signals below s^ as reliable.15 Moreover, the
price suddenly drops when the signal increase through the critical value s^, because
switching from a reliable to an unreliable signal leads to a sudden increase in the risk
premium and thus to a sudden drop in the stock price.
*** INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ***
What is the equilibrium price at s = s^? Let p+(s^)  lim
s#s^
p(s) denote the limit of
p(s) when s approaches s^ from the right and p (s^)  lim
s"s^
p(s) denote the limit of p(s)
when s approaches s^ from the left. Then every price that is contained in the interval
[p+(s^); p (s^)] is an equilibrium. Intuitively, if s = s^, then utility of the representative
investor does not depend on the precision of the signal at the market clearing stock
demand  = 1 and thus there is no ambiguity. The representative investor is averse
to ambiguity and thus there is an interval of equilibrium prices for which she does
not give up the portfolio  = 1 that hedges against ambiguity.
C Shocks to Cash Flow News
The sudden change in the representative investor's worst case scenario belief amplies
the eects of news shocks on stock prices and hence leads to excess volatility. Specif-
ically, supply (dotted line in the right graph of Figure 3) is price inelastic and equal
to demand for an interval of prices at the critical signal value s^ (solid line). A slightly
lower signal value shifts the inaction region of the demand upwards (chain dotted
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line) and thus pushes the (now unique) equilibrium price close to p (s^) whereas a
slightly higher signal value shifts the inaction region downwards (dashed line) and
pushes the new equilibrium price close to p+(s^).16 Hence, small changes to the signal
can result in large changes in the asset price.
To quantify the amplication mechanism of small news shocks I compute the
variance of the asset price conditional on the signal being in an  intervall around
the critical signal value s^. The results are plotted in the left graph of Figure 4 when
the \true" conditional distribution is characterized by  = (a+b)=2.
17 The variance
is small when investors are neutral to risk or ambiguity but not when they are averse
to both. Intuitively, there is no discontinuity in the equilibrium signal-to-price map
if investors are standard expected utility maximizers (a = b = ) or if they are risk
neutral ( = 0). The right graph of Figure 4 shows the corresponding equilibrium
signal-to-price map for a Savage investor with belief  = (a + b)=2, a risk neutral
ambiguity averse investor, and two investors who are averse to risk and ambiguity.18
*** INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ***
The amplication of news shocks occurs when the signal is close to the critical
signal value s^ = d   1
2
 in which case utility of the representative investor is inde-
pendent of signal precision and thus she is perfectly hedged against ambiguity. This
is formalized in the next proposition by computing the size of the price discontinuity.
Proposition 5 (Shocks to Cash Flow News). Let s^ = d  1
2
. Then
p(s^) = lim
s#s^
p(s)  lim
s"s^
p(s) =  1
2
(b   a) (max (; 0) min (; 0)): (19)
The critical signal value s^ is decreasing in the unconditional risk premium of the
asset () because in this case investors are more worried about risk and thus the
news has to be more surprising to avoid a decrease in the risk of the portfolio that
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hedges against ambiguity. Hence, price crashes for risky stocks only occur for big
news surprises. But for big news surprises the dierence between the conditional risk
premium of reliable and unreliable signals is large and thus prices crash more for risky
stocks. This is illustrated in the graphs of 5 that show the equilibrium signal-to-price
map for positive, zero, and negative beta stocks.
*** INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ***
The predictions for the eects of shocks to cash ow news on stock prices are
summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 2. If investors are averse to risk and ambiguity then
(i) small shocks to cash ow news may lead to drastic changes in the price of positive
beta stocks if the news is disappointing,
(ii) small shocks to cash ow news may lead to drastic changes in the price of neg-
ative beta stocks if the news is good,
(iii) and the amplication of news shocks is stronger for riskier stocks.
D Shocks to Asset Betas and Market Risk Premia
So far we have only looked at how changes in cash ow news aect equilibrium stock
prices. I will now take the news about cash ows as given and study how changes to
asset betas and/or market risk premia (and thus shocks to the stock risk premium)
will eect stock prices.
Suppose investors receive ambiguous news about the future dividend of the stock.
The equilibrium price determined in Theorem 2 can be also seen as a mapping from
the unconditional stock risk premium  to the equilibrium price p().19 The left
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graph of Figure 6 shows the equilibrium price mapping for bad news and the right
graph shows it for good news.
There is an interval of equilibrium stock prices if  = 0 or  = c  2   d  s
because in this case the representative investor's utility does not depend on the pre-
cision of the signal and thus there is no ambiguity about the market portfolio. A
change in the beta of the stock changes the hedging demand for labor income risk (z)
and thus aects the mean and the variance of the market portfolio. Suppose news is
worse than expected (left graph). Then the representative investors treats the signal
as reliable for moderate stock risk premia (0 <  < c) and as unreliable otherwise.
If the risk premium increases through either of the two critical values than the rep-
resentative investor dramatically changes the worst case scenario belief and thus an
econometrician who observes the resulting drastic price change may conclude excess
volatility.
*** INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE ***
The amplication mechanism for shocks to stock risk premia is quantied in the
next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Shocks to Stock Risk Premia). Fix s 2 R and dene c = 2   d  s.
Then
p
c = lim
#c p()  lim"c p()
=   (b   a)
 
max
 
d  s; 0 min   d  s; 0 (20)
and
p (0) = lim
#0
p()  lim
"0
p()
=   (b   a)
 
max
 
d  s; 0 min   d  s; 0 : (21)
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If news is very surprising than there is more ambiguity about the posterior mean
and hence there is a bigger dierence between the stock price for reliable and unreliable
signals. I conclude this section with a summary of the predictions for the eects of
shocks to asset betas and/or market risk premia on stock prices.
Corollary 3. If investors are averse to risk and ambiguity and cash ow news is
surprising, then
(i) small shocks to asset betas may lead to drastic changes in stock prices,
(ii) small shocks to market risk premia may lead to drastic changes in stock prices,
(iii) and amplication of these shocks is more severe when news is more surprising.
IV Aggregation
So far I have studied properties of equilibrium stock prices when the economy is
populated by a single representative investors. However, Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv
(2010) and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) document that
there is a lot of heterogeneity in aversion to risk and ambiguity. Moreover, Chapman
and Polkovnichenko (2009) demonstrate that the size of the market risk premium is
sensitive to ignoring heterogeneity because of the endogenous withdrawal of ambiguity
averse investors from the market for the risky asset. Similarly, Easley and O'Hara
(2009) nd that ambiguity averse investors only indirectly aect equilibrium asset
prices because when they invest in the stock market then they behave like standard
expected utility maximizer.
This raises the following three questions that will be addressed in this section:20
(i) Does there exist a representative investor with the properties assumed in Section
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III? Yes, there does exist a representative investor if all investors have the same
ambiguity.
(ii) If there does not exist a representative investor, is there still a discontinuity
in the equilibrium signal-to-price map? If investors dier with respect to their
aversion to ambiguity, then there is still a discontinuity in the equilibrium signal-
to-price map if the range of signal precisions considered by investors overlap.
(iii) Do ambiguity averse investors directly eect asset prices in equilibrium? In
other words, is there an equilibrium in which ambiguity averse investors in-
vest in the stock and behave distinctly dierent from standard expected utility
maximizers? Yes, ambiguity averse investors directly aect equilibrium asset
prices.
Suppose there is no labor income and consider three investors that dier with respect
to their aversion to risk and ambiguity. The rst investor has the highest degree of
aversion to risk and ambiguity (1 = 5 and [a1; b1] = [1=10; 9=10]). Her demand
(dotted line) does not change for a wide range of prices and is only moderately
decreasing otherwise. The second investor (chain-dotted line) has the lowest degree of
aversion to ambiguity (2 = 5=4 and [a2; b2] = [1=4; 3=4]), whereas the third investor
(dashed line) has the lowest degree of risk aversion (3 = 1 and [a3; b3] = [1=4; 4=5]).
The left graph of Figure 7 shows the demand function for all three investors and
aggregate demand.
*** INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE ***
There is a range of prices for which aggregate demand (solid line) is at. The
individual demand for the second investor (chain-dotted line) is constant equal to 2=5
for the same range of prices whereas the demand for the third investor (dashed line) is
1=2 and the demand for the rst investor (dotted line) is 1=10 for an even wider range
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of prices. Hence, aggregate demand sums up to the market clearing stock demand
of one and the range of prices at which the investor with the smallest aversion to
ambiguity does not change her demand comprises the interval of equilibrium prices.
The right graph of Figure 7 shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when the
economy consists of the three investors with dierent aversion to risk and ambiguity
described above (solid line). There is a price discontinuity at the critical signal value
s^ = d 2d=2 = 93:75 in which 1= is the sum of the risk tolerance of the three investor
(1= =
P3
h=1 1=h = 2). Moreover, there is a range of prices [p1; p2] = [89:1; 92:2]
for which all three investors don't change their long stock positions and thus behave
distinctly dierent from standard expected utility maximizers.
Consider the same three investors but assume that they all have the same ambi-
guity [a; b] = [1=4; 3=4]. In this case there exists a representative investor with risk
tolerance equal to the sum of the risk tolerances of all three investors.21 The dashed
line in the right graph of Figure 7 shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map in this
case. If the economy is populated by the three heterogeneous investors, then the price
reacts more to signals lower than s^ and less to signals larger than s^ because there is
more ambiguity than in the economy with the representative investor.
The size of the price discontinuity when there is heterogeneity with respect to
ambiguity is determined by the investor with the lowest degree of ambiguity. This
implies that there is no discontinuity in the equilibrium signal-to-price map if at
least one investor has standard expected utility preferences.22 However, the next
example shows that even with no discontinuity, prices may still abruptly change
because ambiguity averse investors directly aect prices when they change the worst
case scenario belief in equilibrium.
For instance, consider an economy in which one investor is averse to ambiguity
and the other investor is not. The ambiguity averse investor has the range of beliefs
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[a; b] = [1=4; 3=4] and risk aversion  = 1. The Savage investor has the same
risk aversion and the subjective belief m = (a + b)=2 = 1=2. The equilibrium
signal-to-price map is shown by the solid line in the right graph of Figure 8. For
comparison, this graph also shows the equilibrium price when the economy consists
of two Savage investors with subjective beliefs m and b (dashed line) and m and
a (chain-dotted), respectively.
The solid line in the left graph shows the equilibrium demand of the ambiguity
averse investor and the dashed line shows the equilibrium demand of the Savage
investor with belief m. There is a range of signal values for which (i) both investors
are in the market and the ambiguity averse investor behaves like a Savage investor, (ii)
both investors are in the market and the ambiguity averse investor does not behave
like a Savage investor, (iii) the ambiguity averse investor does not participate and does
not behave like a Savage investor (this is not apparent from the gure but occurs for
very bad news and very good news).
*** INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE ***
V Bayesian Model Uncertainty
I have shown in the previous sections that investors who are averse to risk and ambi-
guity hedge against uncertain information quality and thus exhibit portfolio inertia.
This behavior leads to an amplication mechanism of small shocks to cash ow news
and risk premia for equilibrium asset prices. These results are not obtained when
investors are standard expected utility maximizers with known information quality.
I consider in this section investors who maximize standard expected utility and
have a unique prior over the range of signal precisions [a; b] and thus also benet
from hedging uncertainty about information quality. I show that optimal demand
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of these investors is a strictly decreasing and smooth function of the stock price and
hence there is no portfolio inertia. Moreover, the equilibrium stock price is a smooth
function of the signal and hence there is no excess volatility.23
Consider the model described in Section I without the random endowment. The
precision of the signal is random and denoted by ~. It can can take on either the
value a or b with equal probability. Investors choose  to maximize
E
h
u

w0 +

~d  p



j ~s = s
i
= su
 
CES(; a)

+ (1  s)u
 
CES(; b)

; (22)
in which
CES(; ) = w0 +

E
h
~d j ~s = s; ~ = 
i
  p

   1
2
 Var
h
~d j ~s = s; ~ = 
i
2 (23)
and
s  Prob

~ = a j ~s = s

=
 
1 +
s
b
a
e
  1
2
(b a)

d s
d
2! 1
: (24)
Optimal demand (dotted line) when the signal constitutes a one standard devia-
tion bad news surprise is shown in the left graph of Figure 9 and it is shown for a two
standard deviation bad news surprise in the right graph. For comparison, I also plot
the demand of two standard expected utility maximizers with dogmatic beliefs a
(dashed line) and b (chain-dotted line), and demand of an ambiguity averse investor
(solid line).
Optimal demand is a strictly decreasing function of the stock price and thus
there is no portfolio inertia. If news is worse than expected, then investors think that
it is more likely that the signal is unreliable and thus their demand resembles the
demand of a standard expected utility maximizer with dogmatic belief a. Moreover,
investors are worried about risk and thus hedge against uncertain information quality
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by putting less weight on the signal. However, for moderate long positions in the
asset investors deviate from the demand of a standard expected utility maximizer
with dogmatic belief a because investor are more worried about a low posterior
mean than risk when news is bad and thus they hedge by putting more weight on the
signal.
*** INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE ***
The equilibrium signal-to-price map when there is a standard expected utility
maximizing representative investor with random signal precision is shown in Figure 10
(dashed line). This gure also shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when there
are two standard expected utility maximizing representative investors with dogmatic
beliefs a (dashed line) and b (chain-dotted line), and it shows the equilibrium-
signal-to-price map when the representative investor is averse to ambiguity (solid
line). The equilibrium signal-to-price map is smooth when investors are standard
expected utility maximizers and thus there is no excess volatility.
*** INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE ***
VI Conclusion
In this paper I study the eects of risk and ambiguity on optimal portfolios and
equilibrium asset prices when investors receive a signal with unknown precision. I
show that desire of investors to hedge ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia for risky
portfolios. Moreover, I show that small shocks to cash ow news, asset betas or
market risk premia can lead to drastic changes in the worst case scenario belief about
the precision of the signal and thus an econometrician observing the resulting drastic
price change may conclude excess volatility.
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A Proofs
Let  = d+(s  d) denote the posterior asset mean and v = 2d(1 ) the posterior
asset variance. The next lemma is used for the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. The posterior mean of future wealth ~w given in equation (1) is
E [ ~w j ~s = s] = w0 + ((s)  p)  + L+ z
 
(s)  d

= w0 + L+ (p  d)z + ((s)  p) ( + z):
(A.1)
The posterior variance of future wealth ~w given in equation (1) is
Var [ ~w j ~s = s] = Var
h
( + z) ~d+ ~"L j ~s = s
i
= v( + z)
2 + 2L(1  2):
(A.2)
The certainty equivalent of a standard expected utility maximizer with belief  is
CES(; ) = E [ ~w j ~s = s]  1
2
Var [ ~w j ~s = s]
= w0 + L+ (p  d)z   1
2
 2L(1  2)
+ ((s)  p) ( + z)  1
2
 v( + z)
2:
(A.3)
Proof. To determine the posterior mean and variance of future wealth rewrite labor
income as ~L = L + z

~d  d

+ ~"L with z = L=d and ~"L  N(0; 2L (1  2)) and
use the fact that ~"L is independent of ~s.
It is well known that the certainty equivalent of a CARA utility investor with normally
distributed wealth is
CES(; ) = E [ ~w j ~s = s]  1
2
Var [ ~w j ~s = s] : (A.4)
Plugging equation (A.1) and (A.2) into equation (A.4) leads to the certainty equiva-
lent in equation (A.3).
Proof of Proposition 1. The utility of an ambiguity averse investor given in equation
(8) is
min
2[a;b]
E
h
u

w0 +

~d  p

 + ~L

j ~s = s
i
= min
2[a;b]
u
 
CES(; )

(A.5)
= u

min
2[a;b]
CES(; )

; (A.6)
where CES(; ) is given in equation (A.3). Hence, the certainty equivalent of an
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ambiguity averse investor is
CE() = min
2[a;b]
CES(; ) (A.7)
= min
2[a;b]

E [ ~w j ~s = s]  1
2
Var [ ~w j ~s = s]

: (A.8)
To prove Proposition 1 we need to minimize CES(; ) given in equation (A.3) w.r.t.
. Let x =  + z. CES(x; ) does not depend on  if x = 0 and x = ^. Hence,
CE(0) = min
2[a;b]
CES(0; ) = CES(0; a) = CE
S(0; b)
= w0 + L+ (p  d)z   1
2
 2L(1  2)
(A.9)
and
CE(^) = min
2[a;b]
CES(^; ) = CES(^; a) = CE
S(^; b)
= w0 + L+ (p  d)z   1
2
 2L(1  2) + 2
d  s
2d
(s  p):
(A.10)
Taking the rst derivative of CES(x; ) w.r.t.  leads to
@CES(x; )
@
= x(s  d) + 1
2
2dx
2 =
1
2
2d

x  ^

x: (A.11)
Let's consider three dierent cases: (i) s = d , ^ = 0, (ii) s < d , ^ > 0, and (iii)
s > d , ^ < 0.
(i) Let x 2 R then @CES(x;)
@
> 0 for all  2 [a; b] and thus the minimum of
CES(x; ) is attained at  = a. Hence,
CE(x) = min
2[a;b]
CES(x; ) = CES(x; a) 8 x 2 R: (A.12)
CES(x; a) is continuously dierentiable and concave for all x 2 R and thus
CE(x) is continuously dierentiable and concave for all x 2 R.
(ii) Let x < 0 or x > ^ then @CE
S(x;)
@
> 0 for all  2 [a; b] and thus the minimum
of CES(x; ) is attained at  = a. Let 0 < x < ^ then
@CES(x;)
@
< 0 for all
 2 [a; b] and thus the minimum of CES(x; ) is attained at  = b. Let
x = 0 or x = ^ then CE(0) and CE(^) are given in equation (A.9) and (A.10),
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respectively. In this case @CE
S(x;)
@
= 0 for all  2 [a; b]. Hence,
CE(x) =
8<:
CES(x; a) if x  0
CES(x; b) if 0 < x < ^
CES(x; a) if x  ^:
(A.13)
CE(x) is continuous for all x 2 R because CES(x; ) is continuous for all x and
, and CES(^; a) = CE
S(^; b) and CE
S(0; a) = CE
S(0; b).
CES(x; ) is continuously dierentiable for all x 2 R and  2 [a; b] and the
second derivative of CES(x; ) w.r.t. x is negative for all x 2 R and  2 [a; b].
Hence, there is an open neighborhood for all x 2 Rnf0; ^g such that CE(x)
is continuously dierentiable and the second derivative of CES(x) w.r.t. x is
negative.
To verify non-dierentiability at x = 0 and x = ^ and concavity of CE(x) let's
determine the left and right derivative of CE(x) at x = ^ and x = 0:
CE0+(^)  lim
x#^
@CE(x)
@x
= d  p+ 2(s  d)  a(s  d) (A.14)
CE0 (^)  lim
x"^
@CE(x)
@x
= d  p+ 2(s  d)  b(s  d) (A.15)
CE0+(0) = lim
x#0
@CE(x)
@x
= d+ b(s  d)  p (A.16)
CE0 (0) = lim
x"0
@CE(x)
@x
== d+ a(s  d)  p: (A.17)
We have that CE0 (^) > CE0+(^) and CE0 (0) > CE0+(0). Hence, CE(x) is
concave for all x 2 R and dierentiable for all x 2 Rnf0; ^g.
(iii) It is straightforward to show using the same arguments as in the previous case
that
CE(x) =
8<:
CES(x; a) if x  ^
CES(x; b) if ^ < x < 0
CES(x; a) if x  0
(A.18)
and that CE(x) is continuous and concave. Moreover, CE(x) is dierentiable
for all x 2 Rnf0; ^g.
Proof of Proposition 2. To solve for the optimal demand (p) of a Savage investor
with belief  we need to maximize his certainty equivalent which is given in equation
(A.3) with respect to .
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Let x = + z and take the rst derivative of CES(x) w.r.t. x and set it equal to zero:
(s)  p  vx = 0: (A.19)
Solving for x leads to x = ((s)  p)=(v). The certainty equivalent is concave and
thus  = ((s)  p)=(v)  z is the unique maximum of CES().
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider three cases: (i) s   d = 0 , ^ = 0, (ii) s   d < 0 ,
^ > 0, and (iii) s  d > 0 , ^ < 0.
(i) If s = d, then it follows from Proposition 1 that CE() = CES(; a) for all
 2 R and thus it follows from Proposition 2 that (p) = (a(s)  p)=(va)  z.
Moreover, (p) is strictly decreasing in p.
(ii) If s < d, then CE() has two kinks. Let's maximize CE() w.r.t. x =  + z.
Consider the ve subcases (a) p < p1 = a(s)   ^va, (b) p1  p  p2 =
b(s)  ^vb, (c) p2 < p < p3 = b(s), (d) p3  p  p4 = a(s), and (e) p > p4.
(ii)(a) We need to show that x = xa  a(s) pva maximizes CE(x) for all p < p1.
We have that
xa =
a(s)  p
va
>
a(s)  p1
va
= ^: (A.20)
Hence, there exists an  > 0 s.t. CE() = CES(; a) for all  2 (xa  
; xa + ). From Proposition 2 follows that xa is a global maximum of
CES(; a) and thus xa maximizes CE() for all  2 (xa  ; xa+ ). CE()
is concave and thus xa is a global maximum of CE() for all p < p1.
(ii)(b) We need to show that x = ^ maximizes CE(x) for all p1  p  p2. The
certainty equivalent is concave (see Proposition 1) and hence it is sucient
to show that ^ is a local maximum. ^ is a local maximum if there is an
 > 0 such that
CE(^)  CE (x) = min
2[a;b]
CES (x; ) 8x 2 (^   ; ^ + ): (A.21)
For  suciently small we have that
CE(x) =

CES(x; a) if ^  x < ^ + 
CES(x; b) if ^    < x  ^: (A.22)
Hence, we have to show that
CE(^)  CES (x; a) 8x 2 (^; ^ + ) (A.23)
CE(^)  CES (x; b) 8x 2 (^   ; ^): (A.24)
31
Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.23) we have for
all x 2 [^; ^ + ) that24
CES (x; a)  CE(^) = (x  ^)

a(s)  p  ^ va   1
2
 va(x  ^)

 0
(A.25)
Inequality (A.25) is satised for all x 2 [^; ^ + ) if
a(s)  ^ va  p: (A.26)
Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.24) we have for
all x 2 (^   ; ^] that25
CES (x; b)  CE(^) = (x  ^)

b(s)  p  ^ vb   1
2
 vb(x  ^)

 0:
(A.27)
Inequality (A.27) is satised for all x 2 (^   ; ^] if
p  b(s)  ^ vb: (A.28)
Combining equations (A.26) and (A.28) leads to the desired result.
(ii)(c) We need to show that x = xb  b(s) pvb maximizes CE(x) for all p2 < p <
p3. We have that
^ =
b(s)  p2
vb
> xb =
b(s)  p
vb
>
b(s)  p3
vb
= 0: (A.29)
Hence, there exists an  > 0 s.t. CE(x) = CES(x; b) for all x 2 (xb ; xb+
). From Proposition 2 follows that xb is a global maximum of CE
S(x; b)
and thus xb maximizes CE(x) for all x 2 (xb  ; xb+ ). CE(x) is concave
and thus xb is a global maximum of CE(x) for all p2 < p < p3.
(ii)(d) We need to show that x = 0 maximizes CE(x) for all p3  p  p4. The
certainty equivalent is concave (see Proposition 1) and hence it is sucient
to show that x = 0 is a local maximum. x = 0 is a local maximum if there
is an  > 0 such that
CE(0)  CE (x) = min
2[a;b]
CES (x; ) 8x 2 ( ; ): (A.30)
For  suciently small we have that
CE(x) =

CES(x; b) if 0  x < 
CES(x; a) if   < x  0: (A.31)
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Hence, we have to show that
CE(0)  CES (x; b) 8x 2 [0; ) (A.32)
CE(0)  CES (x; a) 8x 2 ( ; 0]: (A.33)
Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.32) we have for
all x 2 [0; ) that26
CES (x; b)  CE(0) = x

b(s)  p  1
2
 vbx

 0: (A.34)
Inequality (A.34) is satised for all x 2 [0; ) if
b(s)  p: (A.35)
Plugging in for both certainty equivalents in equation (A.33) we have for
all x 2 ( ; 0] that27
CES (x; a)  CE(0) = x

a(s)  p  1
2
 vbx

 0 (A.36)
Inequality (A.36) is satised for all x 2 ( ; 0] if
p  a(s): (A.37)
Combining equations (A.35) and (A.37) leads to the desired result.
(ii)(e) We need to show that x = xa  a(s) pva maximizes CE(x) for all p > p4.
We have that
xa =
a(s)  p
va
<
a(s)  p4
va
= 0: (A.38)
Hence, there exists an  > 0 s.t. CE(x) = CES(x; a) for all x 2 (xa ; xa+
). From Proposition 2 follows that xa is a global maximum of CE
S(x; a)
and thus xa maximizes CE(x) for all x 2 (xa  ; xa+ ). CE(x) is concave
and thus xa is a global maximum of CE(x) for all p > p4.
Demand x(p) = (p) + z and it is strictly decreasing in p for the price ranges
considered in (a), (c), and (e) and it is constant for the price ranges considered
in (b) and (d) and hence (p) is a non increasing function of p.
(iii) If s > d, then CE() has two kinks. It is straightforward to show using the
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same arguments as in the previous case that
(p) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
a(s)  p
va
  z p  p1 = a(s)
 z p1 < p  p2 = b(s)
b(s)  p
vb
  z p2 < p  p3 = b(s)  ^vb
^   z p3 < p  p4  a(s)  ^va
a(s)  p
va
  z p > p4:
(A.39)
maximizes CE() for all  2 R and that (p) is non-increasing in the stock price
p.
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows from Theorem 1 that the size of the price region at
which investors exhibit portfolio inertia is p2   p1 and p4   p3. Specically,
p2   p1 = b(s)  a(s)  (vb   va)max

^; 0

= (b   a)(s  d) + 2d(b   a)max

2
d  s
2d
; 0

= (b   a)js  dj
(A.40)
and
p4   p3 = a(s)  b(s)  (va   vb)min

^; 0

=  (b   a)(s  d)  2d(b   a)min

2
d  s
2d
; 0

= (b   a)js  dj:
(A.41)
Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 2 follows that the demand of a Savage in-
vestor with belief  is  = ((s)   p)=(v)   z. The asset is in unit supply in
equilibrium and thus 1 = ((s)  p)=(v)  z. Solving for p leads to equation (14).
Proof of Theorem 2. Take the optimal demand function given in equation (12) of
Theorem 1 and set it equal to the market clearing stock demand of one.
Recall that ^ = 2( d s)=(2d), Var[ ~w] = 2d+2dL+2L > 0,  = ((1 + z)2d) =Var[ ~w],
and  = 2d(1 + z). Consider the three cases (i) z >  1 ,  > 0, (i) z <  1 ,
 < 0, and (i) z =  1,  = 0.
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(i) Consider the three subcases (a) s = s^, (b) s < s^, and (c) s^ > s with s^ =
d  1
2
2d(1 + z) <
d.
(i)(a) Let
pa = a(s^)  (1 + z)va (A.42)
pb = b(s^)  (1 + z)vb: (A.43)
Then
pb   pa = (b   a)1
2
2d(1 + z) > 0 (A.44)
and thus Ps^ = [pa; pb]. We need to verify that for all p 2 Ps^ we have that
(p) = 1. If s = s^ then ^ = 1+ z > 0 and thus it follows from Theorem 1
that (p) = ^   z = 1 if and only if p1  p  p2 with
p1 = a(s^)  (1 + z)va (A.45)
p2 = b(s^)  (1 + z)vb: (A.46)
p1 = pa and p2 = pb and hence Ps^ is the set of equilibrium prices.
(i)(b) We need to verify that p(s) = b(s)  (1 + z)vb leads to (p(s)) = 1 for
all s < s^. If s < s^ then ^ > 1 + z > 0 and thus it follows from Theorem 1
that
(p(s)) =
b(s)  p(s)
vb
  z = 1 (A.47)
if and only if
p2 = b(s) max

^; 0

vb < p
(s) < b(s) min

^; 0

vb = p3: (A.48)
Equation (A.48) is always satised because ^ > 1 + z > 0.
(i)(c) We need to verify that p(s) = a(s)  (1+ z)va leads to (p(s)) = 1 for
all s > s^. If s > s^ then ^ < 1 + z and thus it follows from Theorem 1 that
(p(s)) =
a(s)  p(s)
va
  z = 1 (A.49)
if and only if
p(s) = a(s)  (1 + z)va < p1 = a(s) max

^; 0

va (A.50)
or
p(s) = a(s)  (1 + z)va > p4 = a(s) min

^; 0

va: (A.51)
Equation (A.50) is always satised because (1 + z) > max(^; 0).
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(ii) It is straightforward to show using the same arguments as in case (i) that
p(s) 2
8<:
fa(s)  (1 + z)vag if s < s^
Ps^ if s = s^
fb(s)  (1 + z)vbg if s > s^
(A.52)
in which Ps^ = [pb; pa] with
pb = b(s^)  (1 + z)vb (A.53)
pa = a(s^)  (1 + z)va (A.54)
and
pa   pb =  (b   a)1
2
2d(1 + z) > 0: (A.55)
(iii) Consider the three subcases (a) s = d, (b) s < d, and (c) s > d.
(iii)(a) Then it follows from Proposition 1 that CE() = CES(; a) for all  2 R.
From Proposition 4 follows that p(s) = d is the unique equilibrium price.
(iii)(b) Let pa = a(s) and pb = b(s) then
pb   pa = (b   a)(s  d) < 0 (A.56)
and thus P0(s) = [pb; pa]. We need to verify that for all p 2 P0(s) we
have that (p) = 1. If s < d then ^ > 0. From Theorem 1 follows that
(p) =  z = 1 if and only if
p3 = b(s)  p  p4 = a(s): (A.57)
p3 = pb and p4 = pa and hence P0(s) is the set of equilibrium prices.
(iii)(c) It is straightforward to show using the same arguments as in case (iii)(b)
that (p) =  z = 1 if and only if
p1 = a(s)  p  p2 = b(s) (A.58)
and hence P0(s) = [p1; p2] is the set of equilibrium prices.
Proof of Proposition 5. The right and left limit of the price correspondence given in
equation (18) are
p+(s^) = lim
s#s^
p(s) 2
8<:
f d+ a(s^  d)  (1  a)g if  > 0
P0(s^) if  = 0
f d+ b(s^  d)  (1  b)g if  < 0
(A.59)
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and
p (s^)  lim
s"s^
p(s) 2
8<:
f d+ b(s^  d)  (1  b)g if  > 0
P0(s^) if  = 0
f d+ a(s^  d)  (1  a)g if  < 0;
(A.60)
respectively. It follows that
p(s^) = p+(s^)  p (s^) =   (b   a) 1
2
 < 0 if  > 0 (A.61)
and
p(s^) = p+(s^)  p (s^) = (b   a) 1
2
 < 0 if  < 0: (A.62)
The set of left price limits is identical to the set of right price limits if  = 0 and thus
p(s^) = p+(s^)  p (s^) = 0: (A.63)
It follows that
p(s^) =  1
2
(b   a) (max (; 0) min (; 0)): (A.64)
Note that there is no discontinuity if investors are risk neutral ( = 0) because in
this case  = 0. There is no discontinuity if investors are standard expected utility
maximizers because in this case a = b. Moreover, the price correspondence is upper
hemicontinuous for all  2 R and s 2 R but it is not lower hemicontinuous (and
thus not continuous) for all  6= 0 and s 6= d.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Stock Price). Let  > 0 and Var [ ~w] > 0. Dene c =
2( d  s) and
pa() = d+ a(s  d)  (1  a) (A.65)
pb() = d+ b(s  d)  (1  b): (A.66)
Moreover, p 2 Pc, if 9  2 [a; b] such that p = d+(s  d)  (1 )c and p 2 P0,
if 9  2 [a; b] such that p = d+ (s  d).
Then there is a unique equilibrium stock price correspondence. Specically, if s < d,
then
p() 2
8>>>>><>>>>>:
fpa()g if  > c
Pc if  = c
fpb()g if 0 <  < c
P0 if  = 0
fpa()g if  < 0:
(A.67)
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If s > d, then
p() 2
8>>>>><>>>>>:
fpa()g if  < c
Pc if  = c
fpb()g if c <  < 0
P0 if  = 0
fpa()g if  > 0:
(A.68)
and if s = d, then
p() = pa(): (A.69)
I provide a proof of this Lemma in Section III of the internet appendix.
Proof of Proposition 6. The equilibrium price mapping p() given in equation (A.67)
and (A.68) has the two discontinuities  = 0 and  = c.
It follows from equation (A.67), (A.68), and (A.69) that the right and left limit of
the price mapping p() when  = c are
p+
c = lim
#c p() =

pa() if s  d
pb() if s > d
(A.70)
and
p 
c  lim
"c p(s) =

pa() if s  d
pb() if s < d;
(A.71)
respectively. Hence,
p
c = p+ c  p  c =    (b   a)   d  s  0 if s  d
(b   a)
 
d  s  0 if s  d: (A.72)
which veries equation (20). It is straightforward to verify the size of the disconti-
nuity given in equation (21) using similar arguments. Moreover, note that the price
correspondence p() is upper hemicontinuous for all s 2 R but it is not lower hemi-
continuous (and thus not continuous) for all s 6= d. If s = d then p() is a continuous
function of .
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Notes
1Hence, this paper may shed some light on the fact that in the recent crisis investors
didn't trade as much as one would expected in response to very bad news. \It is kind
of striking," Mr. Utkus (from Vanguard) says. "We had the most drastic market
decline since the Depression, we nearly had a total collapse of the global nancial
system, and all that caused most people not to do much at all." in Zweig (2009)
2Shiller (1992) writes in the introduction: \Prices change in substantial measure
because the investing public en masse capriciously changes its mind".
3Epstein and Schneider (2008) consider an example in which the signal can take
on two values and solve it numerically when investors are risk averse.
4The issue of observational equivalence is often raised in the literature (see Backus,
Routledge, and Zin (September 2004)).
5Epstein and Schneider (2008) consider a simple experiment that describes how
ambiguous information can lead to ambiguity about the posterior distribution even
though the prior distribution is known. The analysis could be generalized to allow
for an ambiguous prior without changing the main results of the paper. I show this
in the internet appendix of this article which is available online in the Supplements
and Datasets section at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.
6Another updating rule that considers this rule as special cases is proposed in
Epstein and Schneider (2007). See also Epstein and Schneider (2003) for updating
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Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) preferences in dynamic models.
7The objective function is assumed to be continuous and the feasible set is compact
and hence I can replace the inmum by the minimum.
8The posterior mean and residual variance of future wealth are given in equation
(A.1) and (A.2) of the appendix.
9Easley and O'Hara (2009) consider investors with CARA utility who are ambigu-
ous about the posterior mean and the variance of the asset. In their paper, investors
always choose the highest possible variance and hence portfolio inertia only occurs at
certainty.
10If the signal conrms the expected value of the dividend (s = d), then there is
no ambiguity about the conditional mean and hence the signal is always treated as
unreliable.
11If ambiguity averse investors take on a short position in the asset, then they
behave like Savage investor with belief a because in this case the worst case scenario
for the posterior asset mean and residual asset variances is an unreliable signal.
12If the signal conveys good news, then the risky portfolio that hedges against
ambiguity is a short position in the asset.
13I assume that there is uncertainty about aggregate wealth; i.e. Var [ ~w] > 0:
14The equilibrium stock price also satises equation (18) if the representative in-
vestors is risk neutral ( = 0 and thus  = 0). The proof is provided in Section II of
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the internet appendix.
15This behavior is empirically supported by Williams (2009) who shows that in-
vestors respond more to bad than to good earnings announcements following an in-
crease in ambiguity.
16A signal value lower than s^ leads to more ambiguity about the posterior mean
because it constitutes a larger news surprise. Hence, the portfolio ^ which hedges
ambiguity is riskier for a signal value below s^ than above s^.
17The result is robust to other choices of .
18The equilibrium stock price when there is no ambiguity about future labor income
and investors are risk neutral and averse to ambiguity simplies to (see Epstein and
Schneider (2008))
p(s) = min
2[a;b]
E
h
~d j ~s = s
i
= d+ a max(s  d; 0) + b min(s  d; 0):
19With slight abuse of notation I denote this mapping also with p() and I report
it in Lemma 2 of the appendix.
20I provide formal proofs of results (i) and (ii) in Section IV of the internet appendix.
21The range of prices at which demand changes its slope does not depend on an
investor's risk aversion and thus all demands can be added up as in the standard
expected utility case.
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22There is also no price discontinuity if investors engage in betting or speculative
trade because then they don't have a belief in common (see Billot, Chateauneuf,
Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) or Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008)).
23I show in this section that there is no portfolio inertia and excess volatility by
means of a simple example and refer the interested reader to Section V of the internet
appendix for a rigorous proof.
24Inequality (A.23) is satised for all x 2 [^; ^ + ) if the right derivative of CE(x)
evaluated at x = ^ is less or equal than zero.
25Inequality (A.24) is satised for all x 2 (^   ; ^] if the left derivative of CE(x)
evaluated at x = ^ is greater equal than zero.
26Inequality (A.32) is satised for all x 2 [0; ) if the right derivative of CE(x)
evaluated at x = 0 is less or equal than zero.
27Inequality (A.33) is satised for all x 2 ( ; 0] if the left derivative of CE(x) at
x = 0 is greater equal than zero.
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Figure 1: Optimal Demand
Both graphs show optimal demand when the signal conveys bad news (s = 75 <
d = 100). The correlation between the stock and labor income is zero (z = 0) in
the left graph and positive (z = 0:4) in the right graph. In both graphs demand is
plotted as a function of the stock price for a Savage investor with belief b (chain
dotted line), for a Savage investor with belief a (dashed line), and for an ambiguity
averse investor with range of beliefs [a; b] (solid line). There is a range of prices
for which an ambiguity averse investor is neither long nor short the stock, does not
change her long stock position, or does not change her short stock position. For all
other prices her demand is equal to the demand of Savage investor with belief a or
b. The parameters are d = 5,  = 2, a = 1=5, and b = 4=5.
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Figure 2: Portfolio Inertia
The left graph shows optimal demand of an ambiguity averse investor when news is
bad and the right graph shows it when news is good. Demand is plotted as a function
of the price for conrming news (solid line), a moderate news surprise (chain-dotted
line), and for a big news surprise (dashed line). Both graphs show that when news
is very surprising, then portfolio inertia is more severe and the portfolio at which
investors exhibit inertia is more risky. The parameters are d = 100, d = 5, a = 1=5,
b = 4=5, z = 0, and  = 2.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Stock Price
The left graph shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map of the stock. Investors treat
the signal as reliable if s < s^ = 75 and as unreliable if s > s^. If the signal increases
through s^ then the risk premium suddenly increases and thus the stock price drops.
The right graph shows supply and demand as a function of the stock price for three
dierent signal realizations. Supply is price inelastic and equal to demand for an
interval of prices at s^. A slightly dierent signal realizations shifts the inaction region
and thus leads to drastic changes in the market clearing stock price. The parameters
are d = 100, d = 5, a = 1=5, b = 4=5,  = 2, and  = 
2
d = 50.
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Figure 4: Shocks to Cash Flow News
The left graph shows the stock price variance conditional on the signal being in an
 intervall around the critical signal value s^. Small news shocks lead to a large
variance when investors are averse to risk and ambiguity. The right graph shows
the equilibrium signal-to-price map of the stock. The stock price has a discontinuity
unless investors are neutral to ambiguity (solid line) or risk neutral (dashed line).
The parameters are d = 100, d = 5, a = 1=5, b = 4=5, and  = 
2
d.
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Figure 5: Positive and Negative Beta Stocks
Both graphs show the equilibrium signal-to-price map for dierent asset betas. There
is a price discontinuity for bad news if the stock beta is positive and for good news if it
is negative. The sudden price drops are more severe for risky stocks. The parameters
are d = 100, d = 5,  = 1, a = 1=10, and b = 9=10.
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Figure 6: Shocks to Stock Risk Premia
Both graphs show the equilibrium risk-premium-to-price map. The signal conveys
bad news in the left graph and good news in the right graph. Small changes to the
stock risk premium may result in drastic changes in the stock price. The price drop
is more severe for big news surprises. The parameters are d = 100, d = 5,  = 1,
a = 1=10, and b = 9=10.
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Figure 7: Aggregation
The left graph shows demand of three dierent investors and aggregate demand when
s^ = d  1
2
2d = 93:75 with risk aversion equal to  = 1=2. Investors dier with respect
to their aversion to risk and ambiguity: (1) 1 = 5 and [a1; b1] = [1=10; 9=10], (2)
2 = 5=4 and [a2; b2] = [1=4; 3=4], and (3) 3 = 1 and [a3; b3] = [1=4; 4=5].
Individual demands add up to one for a range of prices at which the second investor
does not change her demand and thus there is an interval of equilibrium stock prices.
The right graph shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map for an economy that is
populated by the three investors (solid line) and for a representative agent economy
with 1= =
P3
h=1(1=h) = 1=2 and [a; b] =
T3
h=1[ah; bh] = [1=4; 3=4] (dashed
line). The parameters are d = 100 and d = 5.
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Figure 8: Ambiguity Averse and Savage Investors
The right graph shows the equilibrium price as a function of the signal when the
economy consists of two Savage investors with beliefs m = (a+b)=2 and b (dashed
line), two Savage investors with beliefs m and a (chain-dotted line), and one Savage
investor with belief m and one ambiguity averse investor with range of beliefs [a; b]
(solid line). The left graph shows optimal demand of the ambiguity averse investor
(solid line) and the equilibrium demand of the Savage investor with belief m (dashed
line). There is a range of signal values for which (i) both investors are in the market
and the ambiguity averse investor behaves like a Savage investor, (ii) both investors
are in the market and the ambiguity averse investor does not behave like a Savage
investor, (iii) the ambiguity averse investor does not participate (part (iii) is not
apparent from the graphs but occurs for very good or bad news).
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Figure 9: No Portfolio Inertia with Savage Investors
Both graphs show optimal demand of an ambiguity averse investor with a range of
signal precisions [a; b] (solid line), and investors with standard expected utility
who have a unique prior over this range (dotted line), who have the dogmatic belief
a (dashed line), and who have the dogmatic belief b (chain-dotted line). The
left gure shows demand when the signal represents a one standard deviation news
surprise (s = 75:47%) and the right gure shows it for a two standard deviation news
surprise (s = 99:96%). Demands of standard expected utility maximizers are strictly
decreasing in the stock price and thus there is no portfolio inertia. The parameters
are d = 100, d = 5,  = 1, a = 1=10, and b = 9=10.
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Figure 10: No Excess Volatility with Savage Investors
The left graph shows the equilibrium signal-to-price map when  = 0:5 and the right
graph shows it when  = 1. In all graphs the price is plotted for an ambiguity averse
representative investor who has a range of signal precisions [a; b] (solid line), and
for a representative investor with standard expected utility who has a unique prior
over this range (dotted line), who has the dogmatic belief a (dashed line), and who
has the dogmatic belief b (chain-dotted line). The stock price is a smooth function
of the signal and thus there is no excess volatility when the representative investor
maximizes standard expected utility. The parameters are d = 100, d = 5, a = 1=10,
and b = 9=10.
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